Mental models on the material of the biological theory of evolution

Context and relevance. Naive theories are viewed as a specific form of mental models that substantially influence how individuals perceive and interpret scientific information. In the domain of biological evolution, such intuitive representations often conflict with scientific concepts, which makes examining their functioning particularly important. Objective. The aim of the present study was to identify the features of how naive and scientific mental models operate when individuals evaluate the truthfulness of evolutionary statements. Hypothesis. It was assumed that students would demonstrate inconsistencies in their understanding of key concepts of evolutionary theory, and that naive-Darwinian statements would be verified more quickly than Darwinian and Lamarckian ones. Methods and materials. The study involved 83 students of non-biological majors at a Moscow university who completed a verification task involving statements related to biological evolution. Reaction time and accuracy were measured, and the stimuli included naive-Darwinian, Darwinian, and Lamarckian formulations presented in two different versions. Results. The findings revealed pronounced inconsistency in participants’ understanding of the concepts of heredity, natural selection, and variation. Moreover, naive-Darwinian statements were verified faster than Darwinian and Lamarckian statements; this effect was replicated across both stimulus sets, indicating the stability of the corresponding mental models. Conclusions. The results indicate that both naive and scientific theories of biological evolution contribute to the evaluation of statement truthfulness. Discussing these findings through the lens of contemporary dual-process theories allows for proposing potential mechanisms underlying the interaction and competition between intuitive and scientific representations.

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