Conflict-Related Behavior among Sundanese Muslim Students: The Role of Ideology and Perceived Injustice

Introduction

Conflict usually happens [‎3] in interpersonal relationships or between groups. The development of social media encourages conflicts to develop and escalate in an uncontrollable direction. Social media increases information dissemination and facilitates communication and the emergence of new information that could strengthen conflict [‎58].

Religious-based conflicts have recently attracted much attention. In addition to the easily exposed and escalated information through social media, conflicts often involve ideology, beliefs, and emotions with a strong influence on behavior [‎10]. Religion is a central belief system that regulates permissible and impermissible actions and is capable of evoking and controlling sacred emotions [‎7]. An incomprehensive religious understanding might lead to erroneous beliefs and generate negative emotions, prejudice, discrimination, and violence that contradict religious values. Furthermore, religious-based conflicts involve many people from various parts of the world. Since conflicts generally occur through social media, they involve technology-literate young people who may lack personal maturity [‎39]. Monahan, Steinberg, Cauffman, & Mulvey stated that the immaturity of psychological function among students is associated with antisocial behavior, especially amid conflicts [‎26].

The emergence of radicalism among Muslim students has attracted Indonesians’ attention. Setara Institute for Democracy and Peace study entitled "Religious Discourse and Movements Among Students: Mapping Threats to the Pancasila State in State University" lists ten universities whose students were exposed to radicalism [‎36]. In line with this, even the Indonesian Institute of Sciences (2017) insisted that "Radicalism Among Students is Worrying” [‎23]. This condition is worrisome because its offline and online development is uncontrollable [Youngblood, 2017] since it is often associated with violent behavior.

The claim about the emergence of radicalism regarding religion-based conflict among Sundanese Muslim students is interesting to explore for three reasons. First, conflict-related thoughts, feelings, and behaviors are influenced by cultural factors [‎50]. Ecological factors also affect the formation of individual characteristics [‎50]. Therefore, Sundanese Muslim students’ thoughts, feelings, and behavior are influenced by their cultural values.

The Sundanese are the second largest ethnicity in Indonesia, after the Javanese. The Central Bureau of Statistics showed that nearly 36,6 million or 15,5% of Sundanese live in West Java Province. In-group and out-group Sundanese are polite, courteous, friendly, gentle, loving, religious, creative, diligent, and tolerant and enjoy socializing and working together [‎31]. They have a life philosophy of 'sumuhun dawuh' (accepting), "sadaya daya" (surrendering), and "heurin ku letah" (not being blunt). This philosophy may make them less assertive and less likely to demand their rights [‎34]. Subsequently, Sundanese Muslim students are anti-violent and intolerant of radicalism.

Second, religion is sometimes associated with violence because religious people are more vulnerable to violence than secular people [‎21; 55]. However, empirical studies on the relationship between religion and violence show inconsistent results. Baier found that religiosity is not associated with violence against Muslim or Christian youth [‎1]. It is influenced by friendship, self-control, alcohol consumption, and masculine norms [‎1]. Furthermore, Wright found that religious claims related to violence were not empirically proven [Wright, 2016]. Religion protects students from antisocial behaviors [Yeung, 2007] and increases helping behavior [‎12].

Islam, the religion embraced by Muslim students in this study, is often associated with violence. However, the holy book teaches Muslims to tolerate differences ‎[The Quran 2] and respect human values [‎47]. They are also taught to uphold justice [‎44; ‎45], promote prosocial behavior [‎41; 42; ‎43] and respect differences ‎[The Quran 49]. Proper internalization of anti-violence values minimizes the potential for violence due to other influencing factors.

Third, conflicts are associated with both violent and nonviolent behavior. Violent behavior can be physical, psychological, emotional, moral, economic, political, philosophical, or metaphysical. This behavior includes hate speech, hoaxes, character assassination, and cyberbullying on social media.

Nonviolent behavior in conflict situations does not solely imply doing nothing [‎8] or being a substitute for violent behavior because it is powerless. According to Eyo and Ibanga, the behavior also IMPLIES taking the initiative and striving to resolve conflicts without violence [‎8]. Nonviolent behavior could involve demonstrating, protesting, submitting petitions, or being uncooperative.

The factors influencing behavior in conflict situations include the widely examined concept of ideology, which requires further analysis. Ideology is an individual orientation about how a country should be regulated in social, economic, and religious matters [‎27]. It guides thinking and behaving when faced with problems [‎9]. Ideological differences influence the variations in motivation, cognition, and social interaction [‎14]. Additionally, extreme ideology promotes the emergence of violent thoughts, motivations, and behaviors in conflict situations [‎2; 38; 52].

Ideology is structurally complex, comprising knowledge structures about interrelated beliefs, opinions, and values. Cognitive factors also play a role in forming conflict-related actions. Individuals fight for justice when they feel that their groups are treated unfairly by other parties, a phenomenon known as perceived injustice. Previous studies have found that perceived injustice accompanied by angry emotions, group identification, social identity, and dark personality traits promotes violence or extremism [‎29]. Therefore, it is interesting to analyze the role of psychology and culture in shaping religion-based conflict that involves violent and nonviolent behavior.

Methods

Study 1. The first study aimed to explore Sundanese Muslim students’ cognitive, emotional, and behavioral responses to religious-based conflicts and the influencing factors. Religion-based conflicts include inter- and intrareligious conflicts. The study used a survey with an indigenous approach to obtain responses from respondents regarding their experiences of conflicts. Therefore, the survey set consisted of 8 open-ended questions and was distributed online to 224 students from several universities in Indonesia. The participants comprised 80 male and 144 female students. Based on ethnicity, 146 participants were Sundanese, while 78 were non-Sundanese. The collected data were analyzed thematically using NVivo, followed by coding, categorization, and interpretation.

Study 2. The second study aimed to examine the role of ideological factors and perceived injustice using quantitative method. The participants consisted of 494 Muslim students from various universities in Indonesia. They come from various ethnic groups and have social organization affiliations. Some students have backgrounds in Nahdlatul Ulama, Muhammadiyah, Islamic Association (Persis), PMII, Indonesian Muslim Association (HMI), KAMMI, and Muhammadiyah Student Association (IMM).

The analysis was conducted on violent behavior, nonviolent behavior, perceived injustice, and religious fundamentalism ideology. Data were collected online using a political ideology-religious fundamentalism scale of 8 items [‎27], a violent extremist attitude scale of 4 items [‎24], a nonviolent action scale of 6 items [‎4], and a sensitivity to injustice scale of 30 items [‎35]. Descriptive analysis was performed on the variables whose relationship was determined using correlational analysis through SPSS. Moreover, hierarchical regression analysis was used to examined the effect of predictor and moderator variables.

Results

Study 1. The results showed specific cognitive, emotional, and behavioral patterns and psychological factors that influenced the conflict.

Cognitive, emotional, and behavioral responses. There are differences in cognitive responses to intra- and interreligious conflicts (table 1). The most common cognitive response is "questioning the reasons for the conflict". The second most common interreligious cognitive response was "thinking about how the conflict was resolved". Additionally, the second most common cognitive response to intrareligious conflict was "not thinking about".

In the interreligious conflict, there was no demographic difference in the response. However, there were differences in responses between males and females regarding intrareligious conflicts. The male participants' response was dominated by being normal or not thinking about it, while the female participants responded by asking about the trigger for the conflict. One participant stated that:

"What I thought at the time, how can people who understand religion well enough but do things that trigger conflict, what do they think and what is their purpose in doing something like this? That's what still surprises me."

In the context of ethnicity, most Sundanese participants questioned why conflicts arose and considered resolving them. Non-Sundanese participants did not think about or identify the causes of the conflicts. Participants considered resolving conflicts by respecting each other and avoiding violence. One participant responded as follows:

“How can I make fellow Muslims respect each other in terms of furu'iyah. Moreover, it also keeps Muslims loyal to others, not harsh to others. There are even those who are harsh on fellow Muslims, but soft on non-Muslims."

Some participants indicated that the impact had a more emotional aspect and was related to their religious identity, stating:

"I don't think about it; I just do not like it when my religion is vilified."

Table 1

Cognitive Responses

The participants’ emotions when watching intra- and interreligious conflicts were generally negative (table 2). The results showed that 36 of the participants’ emotional responses to interreligious conflicts were sad, 29 were afraid, and 33 were annoyed. In contrast, 44 of the participants’ emotional responses to intrareligious conflicts were mediocre, 33 were sad, and 35 were upset. In intrareligious conflicts, there was no difference in emotional reactions between Sundanese and non-Sundanese or male and female respondents. However, there were differences in the emotional responses to interreligious conflicts. The response of “do not feel anything” was given by 9 male participants and 10 non-Sundanese.

Table 2

Emotional Responses

Meanwhile, the most common behavioral response to inter- and intrareligious-based conflicts (table 3) was staying silent and observing the ongoing conflict. One participant was more focused on the government’s role in dealing with the conflict:

"I only listen to the steps or actions of the government and related institutions to overcome this problem."

Some participants resigned to Allah SWT:

"When there is a heated debate regarding differences in religious understanding, I just keep quiet and listen while taking refuge in Allah from the narrowness of thinking."

The second most common answer was to intervene, as demonstrated in the following example:

"I have witnessed interreligious conflicts. If the topic is still within my reach, I will participate in mediating the dispute. However, if the topic of conflict is difficult enough, I don't think it's in my realm to interfere and I'm afraid I'll say the wrong thing if I don't understand what's being said, hence in this situation, I prefer to just listen and let someone with higher understanding take over."

Other participants sought information:

“I consulted with experts and looked for valid sources. If there is a difference of opinion, but the source is clear, it doesn't matter (following their respective schools of thought). But for matters of faith that are not appropriate, they should be straightened out."

Another response was to take lessons and avoid conflict. There are no differences in behavioral responses to intrareligious conflicts based on gender or ethnicity. However, 18 males preferred resolving or avoiding interreligious conflicts, compared to only 12 females.

Table 3

Behavioral Responses

Religious-based ideology and injustice perception as influential factors. The analysis showed that the psychological factor with the most influence on religion-based conflict was misperception, with 111 responses. A participant stated that the cause was:

"a lack of understanding about other religions besides the one they profess, not understanding each other, being provoked by various parties and misinformation."

Other participants also highlighted the importance of obeying the Islamic law:

“I just conveyed my understanding of the religion and listen to the opinions of other people who have different understandings and respect what he understands as long as it does not deviate from the Shari'a and limitation."

"Disputes in religious understanding may be caused by differences in school or sources of understanding. Therefore, as long as it is still sourced from the Qur'an, hadith, scholars, it is still said to be reasonable."

Responses of the participants indicate that their belief to implement religion in their daily lives (religious fundamentalism ideology) dan perception of their religious group should be treated fairly (perceived injustice) may become the roots of their psychological responses related to the conflict.

Study 2. Correlational analysis showed that fundamentalist students positively related to violent behavior (r = 0,110, p = 0,018) and nonviolent behavior (r = 0,107, p = 0,021). Student violent behavior is also related to perceived injustice (r = 197, p < 0,001). The relationship between perceived injustice and violent behavior varies for victims and observers. The analysis showed that the perceived injustice as a victim (r = 0,237, p < 0,001) has a greater relationship than as an observer (r = 0,167, p < 0,001). Similarly, nonviolent behavior was associated with perceived injustice (r = 0,172, p < 0,001). It was more positively related to perceived injustice as victims (r = 0,274, p < 0,001) rather than as an observer (r = 0,146, p < 0,001).

Hierarchical regression analysis showed that participants with the ideology of religious fundamentalism exhibit more violent behavior when they also have perceived injustice as victims and observers (table 4). The influence of religious fundamentalism on violent behavior increased upon adding the perceived injustice (β = 0,095, p < 0,05). Therefore, perceived injustice increases the relationship between religious fundamentalism and violent behavior.

Table 4

Hierarchical Regression Analysis Results of Violent Action Predictors (Study 2)

Notes: * – p < 0,05; ** – p < 0,01.

Hierarchical regression analysis also showed that religious fundamentalism predicts nonviolent behavior (table 5). Furthermore, perceived injustice as victims positively predicts nonviolent behavior (β = 0,289, p < 0,01) while perceived injustice as perpetrators shows negative effect (β = –0,114, p < 0,05). Meanwhile, there is no moderating effect of perceived injustice on the relationship between religious fundamentalism and nonviolent actions.

Table 5

Hierarchical Regression Analysis Results of Nonviolent Action Predictors (Study 2)

Notes: * – p < 0,05; ** – p < 0,01.

Discussion

The results of the analysis in the first study show that there are patterns of cognitive, emotional and behavioral responses, including psychological and social factors. First, the main responses about psychological factors include a lack of understanding of religions other than one’s own or misperceptions. Misperceptions of interreligious people can trigger conflicts, followed by egoism-fanaticism, intolerant attitudes and ways of thinking, beliefs, negative emotions, and the ability to regulate emotions.

Reid‐Quiñones et al. examined differences in adolescent cognitive, affective, and behavioral responses to violence between witnesses and victims of conflicts [‎32]. However, they found no differences between gender groups. This study showed differences in cognitive responses across genders. Males prefer not to think about conflicts, while females question the causes.

The results of the analysis in the second study show that social factors, including group differences and ethnocentrism, are the largest contributors to the response to religious-based conflicts, followed by the influence of provocation. Social norms and intolerant cultures are quite influential contributors, followed by traditions or habits as the least contributing factor. Social norms and culture, including race, gender, and social classes related to religion, can trigger religious-based conflict in this modern cultural situation [‎51]. Internalizing identity as part of an ingroup is one of the pathways that leads to a negative psychological evaluation of the outgroup. In addition, ideology plays an important role in escalating or reducing conflict due to its influence on motivation, cognition, and society [‎14; 15]. The behavioral outcome caused by using ideology to guide the thinking process can be classified as violent and nonviolent behavior.

In Study 2, religious fundamentalism predicts both violent and nonviolent behavior of Sundanese Muslim participants. This supports previous studies on the relationship between Muslim identity and religious fundamentalism [‎23]. This finding is different from previous study suggesting that fundamentalists tend to act hostilely [‎21; ‎22; 55].

Another finding shows that religious fundamentalism is equally related to violent and nonviolent behavior. This is in line with Kashyap and Lewis, who stated that Muslim and Christian religiosity have the same effect on moral and social attitudes [‎20]. Conversely, Baier stated that religion is not correlated with violence [‎1]. Perceived injustice was used to explain the role of religious fundamentalism in conflict-related behavior. Religious fundamentalism has a greater chance of inciting violence when individuals have high perceived injustice. This supports Pauwels and Heylen, who found that perceived injustice only played a role in religious fundamentalism toward violence [‎30].

Despite its contributions, this study was focused only on Indonesian Sundanese population. Thus, the generalization can further be developed by studying other populations such as other ethnicities or religions. Future research can also explore other personal and social factors influencing conflict-related behaviors.

Conclusions

The study of the religious ideology of fundamentalism and conflict behavior, which is divided into violent and nonviolent behavior, as well as the important role of perceived injustice in the moderation model is tested through qualitative and quantitative methods. The qualitative data described emotional responses, cognition, and behavioral responses to religious-based conflict from an indigenous perspective and highlighted the role of religious-based ideology and perceived injustice influencing these behaviors. Quantitative data confirmed that perceived injustice has a significant role in conflict behavior with the religious ideology of fundamentalism as a predictor. The results of these two studies provide a new perspective on previous research that has not been consistent. Further research may explore possible prevention and intervention in response to violent behavioral responses.

1. Baier D. The Influence of Religiosity on Violent Behavior of Adolescent: A Comparation of Christian and Muslim Religiosity. Journal of Interpersonal Violence, 2013. 29(1), pp. 102–127. DOI:10.1177/0886260513504646
2. Becker M.H. When Extremists Become Violent: Examining the association between social control, social learning, and engagement in violent extremism. Studies Conflict & Terrorism, 2019. 44(12), pp. 1104–1124. DOI:10.1080/1057610X.2019.1626093
3. Bridley S.A., Daffin W.L.Abnormal Psychology (2nd edition). Washington: Washington State University, 2018. 276 p.
4. Brown S., Reimer S.K., Dueck C.A., Gorsuch R., Strong R., Sidesinger T. “A Particular Peace: Psychometric Properties of the Just Peacemaking Inventory.” Peace and Conflict Journal of Peace Psychology, 2008. 14(1), pp. 75–92. DOI:10.1080/10781910701839908
5. Davis H.M., Capobianco S., Kraus A.L. Measuring Conflict-related Behavior: Reliability and Validity Evidence Regarding the Conflict Dynamic Profile. Educational and Psychological Measurement, 2004. 4(4), pp. 707–731. DOI:10.1177/0013164404263878
6. Emerson M.O., Hartman D. The Rise of Religious Fundamentalism. Annual Review of Sociology, 2006. 32, pp. 127–144. DOI:10.1146/annurev.soc.32.061604.123141
7. Emmons A.R. Emotion and Religion. In R. Paloutzian, C.L. Park. (Eds.). Handbook of the Psychology of Religion and Spirituality. New York: The Guilford Press, 2005. 698 p.
8. Eyo B.E., Ibanga A.D. A Colloquy on Violence and Non-Violence: towards A Complementary Conflict Resolution. American Journal of Social Issues and Humanities, 2017. 7(2), pp. 137–150.
9. Freeden M. Ideology A Very Short Introduction. Oxford University Press, 2003. 142 p.
10. Glock C.Y. On the Study of Religious Commitment. Religious Education, Vol. 57, pp. 98–110. DOI:10.1080/003440862057S407
11. Gribbins T., Vandenberg B. Religious fundamentalism, the need for cognitive closure, and helping. International Journal for the Psychology of Religion, Vol. 21(2), pp. 106–114. DOI:10.1080/10508619.2011.556999
12. Guo Q., Liu Z., Tian Q. Religiosity and Prosocial Behavior at National Level. Psychology of Religion and Spirituality, 2018. 12(1), pp. 1–11. DOI:10.1037/rel0000171
13. Hunsberger B. Religion and Prejudice: The Role of Religious Fundamentalism, Quest, and Right-Wing Authoritarianism. Journal of Social Issues, Vol. 51(2), pp. 113–129. DOI:10.1111/j.1540-4560.1995.tb01326.x
14. Jost J.T. The end of the end of ideology. American Psychologist, 2006. 61(7), pp. 651–670. DOI:10.1037/0003- 066X.61.7.651
15. Jost J.T. Elective affinities: On the psychological bases of left-right differences. Psychological Inquiry, 2009. 20(2–3), pp. 129–141. DOI:10.1080/10478400903028599
16. Jost J.T., Glaser J., Kruglanski A.W., Sulloway F.J. Political Conservatism as Motivated Social Cognition. Psychological Bulletin, 2003. 129(3), pp. 339–375. DOI:10.1037/0033-2909.129.3.339
17. Jost J.T., Hawkins C.B., Nosek B.A., Hennes E.P., Stern C., Gosling S.D., Graham J. Belief in a just God (and a just society): A system justification perspective on religious ideology. Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology, Vol. 34(1), pp. 56–81. DOI:10.1037/a0033220
18. Jost J.T., Napier J.L., Thorisdottir H., Gosling S.D., Palfai T.P., Ostafin B. Are Needs to Manage Uncertainty and Threat Associated With Political Conservatism or Ideological Extremity? Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, Vol. 33(7), pp. 989–1007. DOI:10.1177/0146167207301028
19. Jost J.T., Nosek B.A., Gosling S.D. Ideology: Its Resurgence in Social, Personality, and Political Psychology. Perspectives on Psychological Science, 2008. 3(2), pp. 126–136. DOI:10.1111/j.1745- 6916.2008.00070.x
20. Kashyap R., Lewis V.A. British Muslim Youth and Religious Fundamentalism: a quantitative investigation. Ethnic and Racial Studies, 2013. 36(12), pp. 2117–2140. DOI:10.1080/01419870.2012.672761
21. Kimball C. When Religion Becomes Evil: Five warning signs. New York: Harper Collins, 304 p.
22. Koopmans R. Religious Fundamentalism and Hostility against Out-groups: A Comparison of Muslims and Christians in Western Europe, 2015. Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies. 41(1), pp. 33–57. DOI:10.1080/1369183X.2014.935307
23. Lembaga Ilmu Pengetahuan Indonesia. Radikalisme di Kalangan Mahasiswa sudah Mengkhawatirkan [Electronic resource]. URL: http://lipi.go.id/lipimedia/radikalisme-di-kalangan-mahasiswa-sudah-mengkhawatirkan/18630 (Accessed 08.04.2022).
24. Nivette A., Eisner M., Ribeaud D. Developmental predictors of violent extremist attitudes: A test of general strain theory. Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency, Vol. 54(6), pp. 755–790. DOI:10.1177/0022427817699035
25. Moaddel M, Karabenick S.A. Religious Fundamentalism in Eight Muslim-Majority Countries: Reconceptualization and Assessment. Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion, 2018. 57, pp. 676–706. DOI:10.1111/jssr.12549
26. Monahan K., Steinberg L., Cauffman E., Mulvey E. Psychosocial (im)Maturity from Adolescence to Early Adulthood: Distinguishing between adolescence-limited and persisting antisocial behavior. Development and Psychopathology, 2013. 25(4pt1), pp. 1093–1105. DOI:10.1017/S0954579413000394
27. Muluk H., Hudiyana J., Arifin H., Milla M., Shadiqi M., Yustisia W. Re-conceptualizing Political Ideology: The construction of three dimensions scale of ideology in the Indonesian context. XVI European Congress of Psychology, DOI:10.26226/morressier.5cf632c7af72dec2b0554e7d
28. Obaidi M., Anjum G., Lindström J., Bergh R., Celebi E., Baykal M. The Role of Muslim Identity in Predicting Violent Behavioural Intentions to Defend Muslims. Group Processes & Intergroup Relations, 2020. 23(8), pp. 1267–1282. DOI:10.1177/1368430220920929
29. Obaidi M., Bergh R., Sidanius J., Thomsen L. The Mistreatment of My People: Victimization by Proxy and Behavioral Intentions to Commit Violence Among Muslims in Denmark. Political Psychology, 2018. 39(3), pp. 577–593. URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/45095192
30. Pauwels L.J.R., Heylen B. Perceived Group Threat, Perceived Injustice, and Self-Reported Right-Wing Violence: An Integrative Approach to the Explanation Right-Wing Violence. Journal of Interpersonal Violence, Vol. 35(21–22), pp. 4276–4302. DOI:10.1177/0886260517713711
31. Rahman A.A., Sarbini, Tarsono T., Fitriah E., Mulyana A. Studi Eksploratif Mengenai Karakteristik dan Faktor Pembentuk Identitas Etnik Sunda. JPIB: Jurnal Psikologi Islam dan Budaya, 2018. Vol. 1(1), pp. 1–8. DOI:10.15575/jpib.v1i1.2072
32. Reid‐Quiñones K., Kliewer W., Shields B.J., Goodman K., Ray M.H., Wheat E. Cognitive, affective, and behavioral responses to witnessed versus experienced violence. American Journal of Orthopsychiatry, 2011. 81(1), pp. 51–60. DOI:10.1111/j.1939-0025.2010.01071.x
33. Rosidi A. Manusia Sunda. Bandung: PT. Kiblat Utama, 2009.165 p.
34. Rosidi A. Mencari Sosok Manusia Sunda. Jakarta: TP. Dunia Pustaka Jaya, 2010.224 p.
35. Schmitt M., Gollwitzer M., Maes J., Arbach D. Justice sensitivity: Assessment and location in the personality space. European Journal of Psychological Assessment, Vol. 21(3), pp. 202–211. DOI:10.1027/1015-5759.21.3.202
36. Setara Institute for Democracy and Peace. Wacana dan Gerakan Keagamaan di Kalangan Mahasiswa: Memetakan Ancaman atas Negara Pancasila di Perguruan Tinggi Negeri. [Electronic resource]. URL: https://setara-institute.org/wacana-dan-gerakan-keagamaan-di-kalangan-mahasiswa-2/ (Accessed 08.04.2022).
37. Shweder R.A.Rethinking Culture and Personality Theory. In R. Shweder (Ed.). Thinking Through Cultures: Expeditions in Cultural Psychology. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1991, pp. 269–312.
38. Staub E., Pearlman L.A., Gubin A., Hagengimana A. Healing, Reconciliation, Forgiving and the Prevention of Violence After Genocide or Mass Killing: An Intervention And It's Experimental Evaluation in Rwanda. Journal of Social and Clinical Psychology, Vol. 24(3), pp. 297–334. DOI:10.1521/jscp.24.3.297.67617
39. Steinberg L., Cauffman E., Woolard J., Graham S., Banich M. Are Adolescents Less Mature Than Adults?. American Psychologist, 2009. 4(7), pp. 583–594. DOI:10.1037/a0014763
40. The Quran 2:256 (Translated by Departemen Agama Republik Indonesia)
41. The Quran 2:261 (Translated by Departemen Agama Republik Indonesia)
42. The Quran 3:92 (Translated by Departemen Agama Republik Indonesia)
43. The Quran 3:134 (Translated by Departemen Agama Republik Indonesia)
44. The Quran 4:135 (Translated by Departemen Agama Republik Indonesia)
45. The Quran 5:8 (Translated by Departemen Agama Republik Indonesia)
46. The Quran 5:13 (Translated by Departemen Agama Republik Indonesia)
47. The Quran 5:32 (Translated by Departemen Agama Republik Indonesia)
48. The Quran 49:13 (Translated by Departemen Agama Republik Indonesia)
49. Tomislav Pavlović & Renata Franc. Antiheroes Fueled by Injustice: Dark personality traits and perceived group relative deprivation in the prediction of violent extremism. Behavioral Sciences of Terrorism and Political Aggression, 2021. 15(3), pp. 277–302. DOI:10.1080/19434472.2021.1930100
50. Triandis H.C., Suh E.M. Cultural Influence on Personality. Annual Reviews Psychology, 2002. 53, pp. 133–160. DOI:10.1146/annurev.psych.53.100901.135200
51. Wang T. Religion-based Cultural Identity and Conflicts of Migrant Muslim Students in Northwest China. Race Ethnicity and Education, Vol. 21(6), pp. 858–875. DOI:10.1080/13613324.2017.1395324
52. Webber D., Kruglanski A.W. Psychological factors in radicalization: a “3 N”. In Gary LaFree & Joshua D. Frellich (Eds.). The Handbook of the Criminology of Terrorism. JohnWiley & Sons, 2017, 33–46.
53. Wesam Charkawi, Kevin Dunn, Ana-Maria Bliuc. The influences of Social Identity and Perceptions of Injustice on support to Violent Extremism. Behavioral Sciences of Terrorism and Political Aggression, 2021. 13(3), pp. 177–196. DOI:10.1080/19434472.2020.1734046
54. Wright J. More Religion, Less Justification for Violence: A Cross-National Analysis. Archive for the Psychology of Religion, 2016. Vol. 38(2), pp. 159–183. DOI:10.1163/15736121-12341324
55. Wright J.D., Khoo Y. Empirical Perspectives on Religion and Violence. Contemporary Voices: St Andrews Journal of International Relations, 2019. Vol. 1(3), pp. 75–100. DOI:10.15664/jtr.1482
56. Yeung J.W., Chan Y.C., Lee B.L. Youth Religiosity and Substance Use: A meta-analysis from 1995 to 2007. Psychological Reports, 2009. 105(1), pp. 255–266. DOI:10.2466/pr0.105.1.255-266
57. Youngblood M. Extremist Ideology as a Complex Contagion: the spread of far-right radicalization in the United State between 2005 and 2017. Humanities and Social Sciences Communication, Vol. 7(49), pp. 1–10. DOI:10.1057/s41599-020-00546-3
58. Zeitzoff T. How Social Media Is Changing Conflict. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 2017. 61(9), pp. 1970–1991. DOI:10.1177/0022002717721392