Implicit False Beliefs: The State of Art

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Abstract

The article presents a review of a number of modern foreign studies of implicit false beliefs in young children with typical development, hearing impairments, autism spectrum disorders, and primates. The results of studies performed using different methodological paradigms for assessing early development of mental models: violation of expectations and anticipatory looking are analyzed. The results of research on the search for the biological basis of the origins of social cognition using functional near-infrared spectroscopy are presented, as well as the results of research on the relationship between possible predictors of theory of mind (understanding the purpose of another's actions, joint attention, implicit false beliefs) and the success of social cognition in preschool age under typical development. Theoretical conceptualizations of two theory of mind systems are described: the minimal one and the theory of mind. Immediate prospects for future research to resolve existing replication crises and prevent new ones are outlined.

General Information

Keywords: theory of mind, implicit false beliefs, minimal theory of mind, infants, toddlers

Journal rubric: Neurosciences and Cognitive Studies

Article type: review article

DOI: https://doi.org/10.17759/jmfp.2024130204

Funding. The study was carried out within the framework of the state assignment of the Ministry of Science and Higher Education of the Russian Federation number 0138-2024-0009 “Systemic development of the subject in normal, sub-extreme and extreme conditions of life activity”.

Received: 02.05.2024

Accepted:

For citation: Lebedeva E.I., Ilina E.A. Implicit False Beliefs: The State of Art [Elektronnyi resurs]. Sovremennaia zarubezhnaia psikhologiia = Journal of Modern Foreign Psychology, 2024. Vol. 13, no. 2, pp. 44–52. DOI: 10.17759/jmfp.2024130204. (In Russ., аbstr. in Engl.)

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Information About the Authors

Evgenia I. Lebedeva, PhD in Psychology, Senior Researcher, Institute of Psychology of the Russian Academy of Sciences (IP RAS), Moscow, Russia, ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-0888-8273, e-mail: evlebedeva@yandex.ru

Ekaterina A. Ilina, PhD Student, Institute of Psychology of Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow, Russia, ORCID: https://orcid.org/0009-0000-9619-9402, e-mail: ekaterina.ilina.89@inbox.ru

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