Концепции и определения сознания

Термин «сознание» используется для описания трех различных феноменов: 1) указания на состояние людей и других живых существ, когда они бодрствуют и реагируют на сенсорную стимуляцию (живое сознание); 2) понимания или осознания чего-либо (переходное или транзитивное сознание); 3) свойства ментальных состояний (сознание состояния). Будучи взаимосвязанными, эти феномены отличаются друг от друга, и важно различать их концептуально и теоретически. Рассмотрены теории сознания первого порядка, теории глобального рабочего пространства и теории высшего порядка. Теории иллюстрируются содержательными примерами.

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